The decision by US President Joe Biden to allow Ukraine to use long-range American missiles in Russia follows a familiar pattern.
The White House refuses for months to grant a weapons request from Ukraine, fearing it would be escalatory. Kyiv loudly decries the refusal, and just when the request seems to have been parked, the Biden administration approves it.
Ukraine’s request for HIMARS, Abrams tanks, F16s – all followed a similar pattern of refuse and prevaricate, and then grant, almost at the moment when it is too late.
Is it too late for the US-made Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, to make a difference if it hits targets deep inside Russia?
The answer is complex and perhaps explains some of the reluctance of the Biden administration to grant permission.
Firstly, there is a limited supply of ATACMS that Ukraine can get its hands on. So even Kyiv being able to hit deep inside Russia – and the longer range of ATACMS is 100km or 62 miles – is not going to yield an overnight change in the battlefield.
Analysts have listed the volume of Russian targets that are in range of these missiles – with the Institute for the Study of War listing hundreds of targets – after the Biden administration apparently briefed that Russian airfields in ATACMS range had seen their attack aircraft evacuated deeper inside Russia.
But really, Ukraine will not get enough ATACMS to alter the course of the war.
Secondly, Ukraine has been able to penetrate deeper inside Russia using domestically manufactured and cheaper drones. The United States has agreed to help fund the development of these devices, which appear to have caused havoc around Moscow’s airports and across Russia’s energy infrastructure.
Thirdly, the permission to use US precision missiles to hit deeper inside Russia is, as it sounds, quite provocative.
It is true that Moscow is quite militarily weak now, and unlikely to seek full conflict with NATO or the US.
But at some point, the Kremlin will seek to restore its deterrence. Moscow’s intelligence services have been blamed for sabotage of civilian targets across Europe, including recent reports that explosive packages were planted on courier planes inside Europe.
The Biden administration was correct to weigh the practical utility of longer range strikes, against the potential for civilian collateral damage in NATO member states, if Russia felt obliged to somehow hit back.
So it was not as simple or obvious decision as some advocates in Kyiv claimed. The wider goal seems to have been to get the Biden administration to put more skin in the game of Ukraine’s war – to truly takes the gloves off.
Yet the White House is keen to stress the deployment of North Korean troops into Kursk fueled its decision – that this is the US’ response to Moscow’s escalation.
Western officials have noted the North Korean deployment represents the Ukraine conflict expanding and becoming something that the United States’ Indo-Pacific adversaries now have a role in; that it has made the war slightly more global for America.
In Biden’s eyes this is an escalation, in response to an escalation.
But the fact he delayed so long because of the extraordinary symbolism of granting this permission just adds to the potency of the decision he just took.
President-elect Donald Trump may think he can talk peace, but he will inherit a war where the stakes have just got significantly higher.
